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Innovation is increasingly seen as the key driver of economic development strategy 
throughout nations such as the United States. Billions of dollars (based on collected data) 
are allocated to TBED (Technology-based Economic Development) by philanthropic 
organizations, state and local governments, and others to encourage technology 
commercialization and support new firm creation (e.g. Coburn and Berglund, 1994; Hart, 
2004). Exploring TBED is important since governments and other communities are 
investing large amounts in these programs to change the institutions of innovation. Poorly 
designed policies or programs by institutional entrepreneurs could even be detrimental to 
innovation (Baumol, 1990). This is especially disconcerting, since regional political 
officials are observed to have an important role in determining investments and 
implementation strategies.  
One of the challenges that governments confront is the ability to change existing rules 
and norms to adapt to new economic conditions. Individuals may recognize the need for 
adaptation, but they are embedded into an environment that dictates what is feasible and 
how changes to the existing institutions (North, 1990) can be achieved. Understanding 
the latitude of political or economic actors to initiate and implement institutional changes 
in response to new economic challenges is at the root of understanding how to implement 
and achieve successful economic development strategies. By latitude I refer to freedom 
from restraint, and flexibility to initiate changes through new programs and organizations 
in a region (i.e. TBED). Previous studies have not empirically examined the capability of 
actors to initiate change or on how changing incentives to these actors may influence the 
creation of new institutions.  
The goals of this paper are two-fold: First, we explore how political latitude enables 
change to economic institutions. Second, we examine if the same political environment 
promotes inefficiency with regards to governmental investments in organization-based 
programs designed to create institutional changes. 
My study examines more directly the previous findings about the role of politics in 
economic development policy. Analysis is performed on how political latitude (i.e. the 
lack of constraint or competition from opposing political parties) affects regional efforts 
to implement institutional changes in response to economic challenges. Prior work has 
emphasized the role that political competition can have, analogous to market competition, 
in creating efficiency (e.g, Stigler, 1972; Wittman, 1989). At the same time, others 
suggested that officials need control to make significant changes to a jurisdiction’s 
economic institutions (Rodick, 2000; Henisz, 2000; 2004).  
The empirical analysis uses a unique dataset of TBED investments to measure 
institutional changes. This includes over 400 different non-profit organizations along 
with state government program expenditures from 1998 to 2005. Political latitude is 
explored through variables of legislative and gubernatorial control along with the fraction 
of legislative control. The majority of the analysis uses a linear, fixed-effect regression 
model for panel data with various controls for regional economic and political conditions. 
Overall, political latitude was shown to have little positive influence on economic 
development programs and leads to significant problems in the creation of productive 
institutional changes. States responded to economic challenges regardless of the political 
party in control of the government. However, operational efficiency, measured by 
organizational expenditures, was significantly reduced when elected officials had greater 
political latitude. More interesting is how inefficiency materialized: control of the state 
governments by Republicans led to higher monetary investments in institutional change 
while greater legislative representation by Democrats produced more organizations. 
Regardless of party, organizations were susceptible to decreased efficiency when there 
was greater latitude in legislative control or when a higher ratio of program funding was 
provided by the government as opposed to private sources. A regional analysis shows that 
political latitude has a significant and negative influence on organizational efficiency in 
initial stages of development. This is particularly true in regions with a larger fraction of 
government support and where organizations were newly formed.  
The study recommends increased constraints on elected officials and stronger monitoring 
from independent groups to improve the quality of institutional change with little impact 
on the ability of governments to initiate change. Giving elected officials greater latitude 
does not enhance, or hinder, their ability to initiate change in the face of changing 
economic conditions. Therefore, tighter constraints on elected officials can only improve 
the quality of the institutions for innovation. Further, program monitoring should be 
integral to the formation of new organizations as the greatest inefficiencies occur at the 
initial stages of development. 
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